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A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE TAX

CRITS
JAMES D. BRYCE*

I. INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

Recent years have seen the spread of legal academia's favorite
obsession-sex and race as the origin of all of society's ills-to the tax
law.' In my view, this is not a helpful development. This Article will
focus on just a few of the recent writings to illustrate how little useful
analysis there is in this body of writing.
The first general observation is that it is odd to see blacks and
women, who view themselves as disadvantaged, attacking the income
tax. Throughout its history in the United States, the income tax has
been an instrument for redistributing income. It was conceived that
way by its advocates, the Progressives, at the turn of the century.2 It
has always incorporated a progressive rate structure.3 Thus, the
economically disadvantaged receive the benefits of general
governmental benefits such as national defense and federal courts
* Joseph D. Peeler Professor of Law, University of Alabama. B.A., Columbia
University, 1961; J.D., Columbia University, 1970; LL.M. (Taxation), New York
University, 1974. The author acknowledges the valuable assistance of Gary Bedsole, J.D.
candidate 1999, University of Alabama School of Law.
1. See, e.g., EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN (1997); Grace Blumberg,
Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study of Income Taxation of Working Wives and
Mothers, 21 BUFF. L. REv. 49 (1971); Dorothy A. Brown, The MarriageBonus/Penalty in
Black and White, in TAXING AMERICA 45 (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows eds.,
1996); Amy C. Christian, The Joint Return Rate Structure: Identifying and Addressing the
Gendered Nature of the Tax Law, 13 J.L. & POL. 241 (1997); Pamela B. Gann,
Abandoning Marital Status as a Factor in Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 59 TEx. L.
REV. 1 (1980); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, IncomeSharing,and the Joint Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63 (1993); Beverly I. Moran & William
Whitford, A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue Code, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 751; Nancy
C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571 (1996); Lawrence Zelenak, Marriageand
the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 339 (1994); Laura Ann Davis, Note, A Feminist
Justification for the Adoption of an Individual Filing System, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 197
(1988). Some of the writers in this area treat the claims of the proponents of critical tax
analysis with healthy skepticism. See, e.g., Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism:
Competing Goals and InstitutionalChoices,96 COLUM. L. REV. 2001 (1996).
2. See JOHN F. WriTE, THE POLrmcs AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL
INCOME TAX 70-79 (1985).
3. See id. at 258 fig.12.1, 263 fig.12.2.
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while paying only a small part of the cost of these benefits. In
addition, a substantial part of the income tax revenue is used for
explicitly redistributive measures, for example, AFDC, Medicaid,
and food stamps, which truly take from the rich and give to the poor.
Would the critical tax writers be happier if the revenue to provide
these services were raised by a consumption tax rather than by an
imperfect income tax?
The second general observation is that most of this literature
starts with the premise that either women or blacks are oppressed.
Starting with the premise that something is wrong, it is not surprising
that things are found about which to complain. This is all expressed
in the voguish terms of struggle:
"patriarchy," "racial'4
subordination," "subordination of women," and "social injustice."
The solutions to the critical tax theorists' grievances, however, are
stated in such general terms that it is impossible to subject them to
rigorous analysis. 5
A third observation is that many of these articles have a heavy
overlay of nonlegal technical material-particularly statistics and
economics. 6 There is, however, very little legal analysis; in fact, the
authors pay little attention to the details of the income tax as the law
has developed.
4. MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 4; Christian, supra note 1, at 246; Moran &
Whitford, supra note 1, at 751, 756.
5. See, e.g., Christian, supra note 1, at 376 (arguing that more study is required in
order to determine whether tax policy should encourage women to enter the paid work

force).
6. See MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 168-80 (elaborating on optimal tax theory);
Moran & Whitford, supra note 1, app. at 804 (explaining when logistic regressions are
used and when least squares regressions are used).
7. A "sitting duck" example of this appears in the article by Professors Moran and
Whitford. In their discussion of the marriage penalty, the breakpoint between the 15%
and 28% brackets is incorrect; what they indicate to be the 1995 breakpoint is clearly the
1986 breakpoint before the proper indexing adjustments. See Moran & Whitford, supra
note 1, at 792; see also I.R.C. § 1(f) (West Supp. 1998) (requiring indexing of brackets
after 1987). Admittedly, the exact breakpoint between the 15% and 28% brackets is not
important to their explanation of the marriage penalty, but such an obvious factual error
shows their lack of concern for the details of the income tax.
In their discussion of employee benefits, Professors Moran and Whitford suggest
that:
the amount of annual employer pension contributions that receive tax deferred
treatment might be capped. Here the goal is to allow the tax benefits of deferral
to employer contributions sufficient to provide a middle, or even an upper
middle, income lifestyle, without providing the same tax benefit for
contributions to pensions that are principally a vehicle for investing accumulated
wealth.
Moran & Whitford, supra note 1, at 790. In fact, there are many such rules: the limit on
elective contributions, see I.R.C. § 402(g) (West Supp. 1998), the full funding limitation,
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II. RACE AND TAXES
A.

General
Professors Moran and Whitford argue that the Internal Revenue

Code ("I.R.C." or "the Code") discriminates against blacks.'

They

base this argument on the fact that various provisions benefiting
taxpayers are utilized by a smaller percentage of blacks than whites.

The four broad categories of such rules are: (1) property rules, (2)
tax benefits of home ownership, (3) employee benefits, and (4) the
marriage penalty.9

Even if Professors Moran and Whitford are correct, they have
discovered a few tiny truths at the cost of overlooking the giant truth:

The Code discriminates against whites. The progressive rate
structure results in whites paying most of the federal income tax.
This discrimination has increased in recent years as Congress has
added a complex tangle of phase-outs to the Code explicitly to

deprive high-income taxpayers, who are predominantly white, of
various benefits. 10
More than one-half of the federal income tax is paid by the

10.5% of taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes of $75,000 or
greater."

As would be expected, the Internal Revenue Service

("IRS") statistics do not break down taxpayers by race, so the racial
makeup of this discriminated-against group must be deduced from12
other sources. The Census Bureau's Current Population Studies
see id. § 412, the maximum benefit rules, see id. § 415, the top-heavy rules, see id. § 416,
and, at the time their article was written, a very burdensome tax on excess distributions
from qualified plans, see I.R.C. § 4980A, repealed by Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L.
No. 105-34, § 1073(a), 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. (111 Stat.) 788, 948.
8. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 1, at 751.
9. See id. at 755.
10. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 68 (West Supp. 1998) (disallowing itemized deductions as
adjusted gross income increases over $100,000 (joint return, indexed)); id. § 151(d)
(phasing out personal exemptions as adjusted gross income increases over $150,000 (joint
return, indexed)); id. § 24(b)(2) (phasing out child care credit as modified adjusted gross
income increases over $110,000 (joint return, indexed)); id. § 25A(d)(2) (phasing out
Hope Scholarship and Lifetime Learning credits as modified adjusted gross income
increases over $80,000 (joint return, indexed)).
11. See Therese M. Cruciano, Individual Income Tax Returns, Preliminary Data,
1994, IRS STAT. INCOME BULL., Spring 1996, at 6, 24 tbl.1. Total individual income tax
liability in 1994 was approximately $556 billion, of which $303 billion (54%) was paid by
9.27 million taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes over $75,000 out of a total 87.8 million
taxpayers. See id.
12. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION

REPORTS, CONSUMER INCOME, MONEY INCOME IN THE UNITED STATES: 1996 (1997)

[hereinafter BUREAU OF THE CENSUS].
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figures for total cash income are instructive in this regard, although
they are not strictly comparable because they do not take into
account the various deductions allowed in converting total income to
adjusted gross income. 3 The Census Bureau's figures show that high
income earners are disproportionately white. Nearly 15 million white
families (out of a total 85 million white households) had incomes
greater than $75,000, but only about 900,000 black households (out of
a total 12 million) had such incomes. 4 Looking at family income
rather than household income, in 1996 there were nearly 13 million
white families and 750,000 black families in the over-$75,000 income
groups.' 5 In percentage terms, 21.7% of white householders had
incomes over $75,000; only 7.4% of black householders had such
incomes. 6 At the other end of the scale, few householders with
incomes under $10,000 paid any significant income tax. Among white
householders, about 10% fell into this category, and among blacks,
23%.

17

In light of the burden of the progressive rates on whites,
Professors Moran and Whitford miss the point by focusing on social
science data showing how the relative incomes of black husbands and
wives and white husbands and wives affect the relative marriage
penalties of blacks and whites.'8 The same could be said for the
different rates of utilizing the exclusion of gifts from the income of
the donee, different amounts of benefit from home ownership, and
different utilization of tax-free fringe benefits for employees.
Many of the provisions that are alleged by Professors Moran and
Whitford to discriminate against blacks mitigate the effect of the
13. Total cash income would be reduced by various deductions of business-related
expense (and alimony) in arriving at adjusted gross inconje. See I.R.C. §§ 61, 62 (West
Supp. 1998). On the other hand, total cash income does riot include capital gains, which
would be included in adjusted gross income. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 12,
at xiv tbl.D.
14. See BUREAU OFTHE CENSUS, supra note 12, at 5 tbl.2. The income measurement
used here does not include capital gains, thus probably understating the number of whites
in the over-$75,000 group. See id. at A-3.
15. See id. at 17 tbl.5. The term "families" refers to two or more related persons
residing together; "households" refers to all of the persons who occupy a housing unit.
Neither of these terms is the same as the filing units for income tax purposes. For
example, children residing with the family might be separate taxpayers. A group of
young people sharing an apartment would constitute a household but would include
multiple taxpayers. Also, it appears that "families" excludes single-person households.
See id. at A-1.
16. See id. at B-3 tbl.B-2. The term "householder" refers to the person maintaining
the household, that is, the owner or lessee. See id. at A-1.
17. See id. at 5 tbl.2.
18. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 1, at 794-96.
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graduated rates in order to implement various policies. For example,
the tax-free step-up of basis at death19 avoids the administrative
problems of determining the decedent's basis in the property, and the
deferral of gain on the sale of homes2° enhanced both job and social
mobility. Professors Moran and Whitford view these provisions as
discriminating against blacks; 21 the provisions can just as well be
viewed as reducing the discrimination against whites.
The position of Professors Moran and Whitford may be that it is
appropriate for whites to pay most-perhaps all-of the income tax.
It may be their position that the progressive rate structure is an
essential part of the tax system and that the provisions they complain
about, for example, capital gains rates and joint returns, are not
essential parts of the tax system. If they really want to attack the
Code, why do they not go straight to the point and argue that the
existing rate structure is insufficiently progressive and that the Code
discriminates against blacks (and other low-income groups) by -not
taking much more of the income of high-income (disproportionately
white) taxpayers for redistribution?
Even if there were merit in the argument that the Code
discriminates against blacks, where does the argument lead? Studies
of income distribution show that the category "Asian and Pacific
Islander" has the highest median household income, followed by
whites, followed by blacks.' From Moran and Whitford's standpoint,
then, the Code discriminates in favor of Asians and Pacific Islanders
to the detriment of blacks. Would they contend that the tax law
discriminates against whites vis-h-vis Asians and Pacific Islanders?
B. Property Transactions
Many of the provisions complained of deal with property

19. See I.R.C. § 1014 (West Supp. 1998).
20. The authors are dealing, of course, with § 1034 before its repeal. See I.R.C.
§ 1034, repealed by Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 312(b), 1997
U.S.C.C.A.N. (111 Stat.) 788, 839. To summarize briefly, § 1034 allowed a taxpayer to
defer the gain on the sale of a principal residence to the extent the proceeds of selling the
old home were reinvested in a new home.
21. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 1, at 755.
22. The median income in 1996 for Asians and Pacific Islanders was $43,276, for the
category white-not-Hispanic, $38,787, for blacks, $23,482. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
supra note 12, at vii tbl.A; see also BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1996, at 48-49 tbl.49, tbl.50
[hereinafter 1996 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT] (showing that 46.2% of Asians and Pacific
Islanders, 39.4% of whites, and 21.2% of blacks were in the over-$50,000 income per
household category (1995 figures)).
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transactions.23 To the extent that the income tax treatment of these
property transactions falls short of the ideal treatment, it will benefit
whites, who own much more property than blacks.24 While this
statement is true, Professors Moran and Whitford do not adequately
develop it.
For some reason, Professors Moran and Whitford use
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass' as the standard for the
comprehensive income tax base.26 This is very odd. Glenshaw Glass
did not purport to define the comprehensive tax base. Rather, it
interpreted the term "gross income," as used in present § 61 of the
Code, to include "undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized,
and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion."2 7 Its
historical importance was in eliminating the old Eisner v. Macomber 8
definition of income, "' "the gain derived from capital, from labor, or
from both combined," ' "29 from the tax law.
Its continued
significance is merely as a test of whether ambiguous receipts should
be included in gross income."
If the authors seek to define a comprehensive tax base, why did
they not use the Haig-Simons definition: "Personal income may be
defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights
exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store
of property rights between the beginning and end of the period in
question."'" Haig-Simons is the usual starting point for the discussion
of a comprehensive tax base,32 although Professor Brooks questions
whether it should be.33
The authors could have strengthened their case greatly by using
Haig-Simons as their starting point for the tax base. With a great
23. See Moran & Whitford, supranote 1, at 773-83.
24. See MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE
WEALTH 86 tbl.4.4, 106 tbl.5.3 (1997) (showing statistics comparing the wealth and assets
of blacks and whites).
25. 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
26. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 1, at 759.
27. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 431.
28. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
29. Id. at 207 (quoting Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185 (1918) (quoting
Stratton's Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415 (1913))).
30. See, e.g., Martin D. Ginsburg, Taxing the Components of Income: A U.S.
Perspective, 86 GEO. L.J. 123, 126 & n.23 (1997).
31. HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAxATION 50 (1938).
32. See WITrE, supra note 2, at 49.
33. See Jennifer J.S. Brooks, Taxation and Human Capital, in TAXING AMERICA,
supra note 1, at 58, 59-60; Jennifer J.S. Brooks, Taxation and Human Capital, 13 AM. J.
TAX POL'Y 189, 192-96 (1996). (These are two slightly different versions of the same
article.)
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fanfare of statistics, they show that whites enjoy most of the untaxed
appreciation in homes, real estate, and stocks, 34 and recommend the
taxation of unrealized appreciation in publicly traded stocks and
nonresidential real estate. 5 This recommendation is not supported
by their reliance on Glenshaw Glass, which explicitly requires
realization, but would be supported by the Haig-Simons approach of
measuring changes in net worth, whether or not realized.
C. What Do They Want?
It is not clear what Professors Moran and Whitford are arguing.
They disclaim any racial animus on the part of Congress,
acknowledging that the Code is not deliberately structured to impose
an extra burden on blacks. 6 On the other hand, they go to some
length to eliminate the effect of socioeconomic factors other than
race from their statistical studies and conclude that the Code does
discriminate against blacks even after eliminating all other factors.37
In a word, poor blacks are treated worse under the Code than are
poor whites.
They appear to be arguing that there is a black lifestyle (as
distinguished from a low-income lifestyle that happens to be the
lifestyle of most blacks) and that the Code discriminates against
taxpayers who live the black lifestyle. It is surely inaccurate to
stereotype blacks this way, just as it would be inaccurate to
stereotype all whites as living lives of wealth and leisure. But even
accepting the authors' stereotyping, they are again looking at the
facts from the wrong perspective.
Viewing the income tax from the more sensible perspective of
"who pays," the lifestyle against which the income tax discriminates
is a lifestyle devoted to education, work, saving, and investing. This
lifestyle often results in high incomes and accumulations of property.
The income tax (and estate and gift taxes, which are not at issue in
Moran and Whitford's article) discriminates against this lifestyle by
taking large amounts of income and accumulated property.

34. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 1, at 763-70.
35. See id. at 782.
36. See id. at 758, 801.
37. See id. at 770-71 (concluding that blacks are less likely to own financial assets that
are tax-favored), 772 (concluding that blacks are less likely to enjoy tax benefits
associated with gifts and inheritances), app. at 804-17 (reporting statistical results).
38. Professors Moran and Whitford discuss "lifestyle" throughout their article, see,
e.g., id. at 758, 802 n.176, but they never define the term. I presume it refers to such
matters as marital status, spending patterns, and the value placed on education.
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It is true that proportionately more whites than blacks live
lifestyles devoted to education, work, saving, and investing, but it is
also true that proportionately more Asians and Pacific Islanders than
whites live this lifestyle. 9 Many blacks already enjoy this lifestyle
and the proportion of blacks living this lifestyle is increasing faster
than is the proportion of whites living this lifestyle." As society
evolves, the provisions about which Professors Moran and Whitford
complain will benefit more and more blacks.
That Professors Moran and Whitford are ambivalent in their
goals is shown in their discussion of the "Black Code," where they
end up arguing for the exclusion of gifts from the income of the
donee and for the deferral of gain on the sale of homes, reasoning
that these rules will make it possible for blacks in the future to
accumulate more wealth.4 Of course! Will not all the provisions
about which they complain do the same? As blacks buy more homes
and more expensive homes, they too will begin to accumulate wealth
that can be shielded from the income tax by home mortgage interest
and property tax deductions. As they buy more stocks, they will
benefit from the reduced capital gains rates and by the step-up in
basis at death. Even with respect to the marriage penalty, which they
oppose, Professors Moran and Whitford admit that a Black Congress
might want to retain the present structure, which provides couples
39. As to education, Asians and Pacific Islanders have much higher educational
attainments than whites, who in turn have much higher educational achievements than
blacks. Based on 1990 data, the percentages of the different groups completing four years
or more of college were: Asian and Pacific Islander, 39.9%; white, 22.0%; and black,
11.3%. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNrrED STATES: 1997, at 159 tbl.243 [hereinafter 1997 STATISTICAL
ABSTRACr].

As to income, the median household incomes of the different groups are (1995
figures): Asian and Pacific Islander, $46,356; white, $42,646; and black, $25,970. See id. at
469 tbl.724.
There are few data on savings and investment or the resulting wealth accumulations.
See OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 24, at 53-58. I rest my case on the high positive
correlation of wealth with both educational achievement and income. See 1997
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra, at 480 tbl.747 (showing that education and income are
correlated with net worth); id. at 481 tbl.748 (showing that income is correlated with
nonfinancial assets).
40. The percentage of blacks in the over-$75,000 household category increased from
2.6% to 9.0% between 1967 and 1996, a faster rate of increase than by whites (including
those of Hispanic origin), of which the percentage in the over-$75,000 household category
increased from 7.9% to 21.7%. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 12, at B-9 to B10 tbl.B-4; see also 1996 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 22, at 48 tbl.49 (showing a
similar rapid increase in the percentage of blacks in the over-$50,000 group between 1980
and 1995).
41. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 1, at 783.
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with a marriage bonus when the wife does not participate in the labor
force, because "there are social gains from women working mostly in

tdhe home, such as better quality childcare."42
D. A Counterargument: The EarnedIncome Tax Credit
There is at least one provision in the Code that helps blacks
disproportionately. The earned income tax credit is a refundable

credit based on a percentage of the earned income of a taxpayer with
dependent children-in essence a negative income tax for these
taxpayers.43 (There is a somewhat different rule that refunds some of
the FICA tax to low-income taxpayers who do not have children. 44)
The earned income tax credit contains a phase-out so that it
disappears as income rises.45 The credit is granted to individual

taxpayers, but there is a requirement that married individuals file
joint returns. 46 The effect of these rules is an enormous marriage
penalty on the working poor because the phase-out will often

eliminate the earned income tax credit when both spouses' incomes
are included on their joint return.

The structure of the earned income tax credit benefits not poor
parents in general, but poor parents who are not married.

That

feature naturally favors those who live what Professors Moran and
Whitford characterize as a black lifestyle.47 Blacks are much more
likely not only to be poor, 4 but also to be unmarried.49 Because lowincome whites are more likely to be married, their earned income tax
credits are reduced or eliminated by the phase-out; low-income

blacks are less likely to be married and less likely to be affected by

42. Id. at 798.

43. See I.R.C. § 32 (West Supp. 1998).
44. For individuals with no qualifying children, the earned income tax credit is
computed at 7.65%, see id. § 32(b), which is exactly the same as the FICA tax imposed on
the employee, see I.R.C. § 3101 (1994).
45. See I.R.C. § 32(a)(2), (b)(2) (West Supp. 1998).
46. See id. § 32(d).

47. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 1, at 797 n.163.
48. See 1997 STATIsTICAL ABSTRACr, supra note 39, at 49 tbl.49 (showing that
30.3% of black families, compared to 11.6% of white families, had income under $15,000
(1996 figures)); idL at 475 tbl.736 (showing that 29.3% of black families, compared to
11.2% of white families, were below the poverty level (1995 figures)); id. at 475 tbl.737
(showing that 41.5% of black children, compared to 15.5% of white children, were living
in families below the poverty level (1995 figures)).
49. See id. at 49 tbl.49 (showing that 46.1% of black households with children consist
of married couples, compared to 81.3% of white households with children; and that 29.8%
of black households with children consist of a female with no spouse present, compared to
8.5% of white households with children (1996 figures)).
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the phase-out." It is therefore not surprising that economists have
estimated that about 24% of earned income tax credit recipients are
black." If anything, the earned income tax credit seems designed to
reward the black lifestyle.
III. MARRIAGE PENALTIES AND BONUSES

There is a long history of disputes about the effect of marriage
and the income tax. 2 More recently, following academic trends, the
complaints have changed to focus on the effect of the income tax on
women, especially married women. As is well described in the
writing on this subject, many married couples suffer a marriage
penalty resulting from the effect of the progressive rates on their
combined incomes. 3 Others approach the same fact from the
standpoint of the wife, who finds that she has little of her earnings
left after the (nondeductible) expenses of working and taxes
(computed at the high marginal rates applicable to her income added
to her husband's). For various reasons, writers from the critical
schools think that this is a problem. Mandatory individual filing
is
55
the usual prescription; some authors prescribe stronger medicine.
This analysis will focus on the marriage penalty arising from the
rate structure. Some of the other aspects of the marriage penalty, for
example, the reduced standard deduction on a joint return, are not
very interesting topics. Others are large topics in themselves, for
example, the Social Security taxes (FICA and SECA). 6 It would be
misleading to discuss FICA and SECA as taxes without discussing
the benefit structure as well because, unlike the situation with the
income tax, where there is no connection between the taxes paid and
50. See Steve Rawlings & Arlene Saluter, Household and Family Characteristics:
March 1994, in BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS xvii fig.5 (1995) (showing that 75% of white families with children
consist of two-parent groups, while only 35% of black families with children consist of
two-parent groups).
51. See John Karl Scholz, The EarnedIncome Tax Credit: Participation,Compliance,
andAntipoverty Effectiveness, 47 NAT'L TAX J. 63 app. at 86 tbl.1 (1994) (1990 figures).
52. The classic discussion of the issues is Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation
and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389 (1975).
53. See id. at 1429-32.
54. See MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 12-15; Alstott, supra note 1, at 2009; Blumberg,
supranote 1, at 52-53; Gann, supra note 1, at 41-43; Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 109-10.
55. Professors Moran and Whitford would allow married couples to use the more
advantageous of single or joint returns. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 1, at 798-99.
Professor McCaffery would impose higher taxes on husbands in this situation. See
MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 200-01.
56. See I.R.C. §§ 1401,3101,3111 (1994 & West Supp. 1998).
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the benefits received, taxpayers receive benefits in return for their
FICA and SECA contributions, and those benefits have a strong

redistributive element.
A. Facts
The Congressional Budget Office study For Better or Worse57
shows that more couples enjoy a marriage bonus than suffer a
marriage penalty.58 The average size of the penalty is slightly larger
than the average amount of the bonus,5 9 but the differences are small.

It is fair to say that the benefits and burdens are about equally split.
It is rarely noted in the commentary on this important study that
if the effect of the earned income tax credit is removed, there is a

large net bonus. ° Thus, in the income tax proper, as distinguished
from the income redistribution scheme administered through the
earned income tax credit, more taxpayers benefit than suffer from
the present rate structure.

B.

The MarriagePenalty
A and B marry. Each had taxable income of $25,000 before
marriage. If no other factors change, A and B as a couple will pay
more than twice the tax each paid while single. The critical tax
theorists uniformly consider this effect to be a problem.
The marriage penalty in this situation arises because the joint

return breakpoints between rate brackets are less than twice the
single return breakpoints. 61 The joint return breakpoints are only
57. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, FOR BETFER OR WORSE: MARRIAGE AND
THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX (1997) [hereinafter CBO].
58. See id. at 30 tbl.4. This conclusion is based on the "basic measure" of penalty.
See id. at 29 box 6 (describing five different ways to compute the marriage bonus/penalty,
depending on the assumptions used to compute the alternative tax liabilities of joint filers
if joint filing were not permitted). The basic measure, which prorates the deductions
between the spouses, appears to be the most realistic baseline.
Other economists investigating the marriage penalty have concluded that penalties
generally exceed bonuses but that the measures of penalty and bonus are highly
dependent on the methodology used. See, e.g., James Aim & Leslie A. Whittington, The
Rise and Falland Rise... of the MarriageTax, 49 NAT'LTAXJ. 571,575 (1996).
59. See CBO, supra note 57, at 30 tbl.4.
60. See id. at 31. The "basic measure," which includes the effect of the earned
income tax credit in determining the marriage bonus/penalty, shows 3.1 million more
taxpayers with penalties and 2 million fewer with bonuses than when the marriage
bonus/penalty is determined with reference to "basic measure less EITC." See id. at 30
tbl.4. For these taxpayers, changes in the earned income tax credit are a major factor in
the marriage bonus/penalty.
61. See I.R.C. § 1(a), (c) (West Supp. 1998). Consider two taxpayers with taxable
incomes in 1997 of $24,650, which is the maximum amount to which the 15% bracket
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about 60% greater than the single return breakpoints in order to
reduce the disparity between the taxes on married and single
individuals at the same income level.62

Much is made of the desirability of the income tax being
marriage-neutral even though marriage changes a whole array of
legal relationships. (Would people marry if it did not?) Consider a
brief illustrative list of areas of law that are not marriage-neutral:
descent and distribution, 63 property,' bankruptcy, 65 federal tax liens,66
70
evidence,67 pension law, 68 tort,69 and contract.

applies for single taxpayers. See Rev. Proc. 96-59, 1996-2 C.B. 392, 393 tbl.3. If they
marry, they will have taxable income of $49,300 (ignoring the loss of some of their
standard deduction). On the joint return, the maximum amount of income taxed at 15%
is $41,200. See id. The remaining $8100 of their joint taxable income is taxed at 28%,
giving rise to a marriage penalty of $1053 ($8100 x (28% - 15%)). If the joint return
breakpoint were twice the single return breakpoint, all of their income would be taxed in
the 15% bracket, and there would be no marriage penalty.
62. See I.R.C. § 1(a), (c) (West Supp. 1998). Consider two taxpayers, one single and
one married, each having taxable income of $49,300 in 1997. The single taxpayer will pay
tax on $24,650 at 15% and on another $24,650 at 28%. See Rev. Proc. 96-59, 1996-2 C.B.
at 393 tbl.3 (setting $24,650 as the breakpoint between the 15% and 28% brackets). If the
joint return breakpoint were twice the single return breakpoint, the married taxpayer
would pay tax on the entire $49,300 at 15%. See id. The married taxpayer would enjoy a
marriage bonus of $3205 (13% x $24,650). The breakpoint between the 15% and 28%
brackets for married taxpayers is only $41,200, so that the married taxpayer faces a 28%
rate on $8100, and thus enjoys a marriage bonus of only $2152.
63. Spouses are typically heirs of a person's property in intestacy and are allowed to
elect against the will of the decedent. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-102, 2-201 to -207
(amended 1990), 8 U.L.A. 81, 101-18 (1998).
64. Under the community property regimes of eight states, spouses have equal
interests in the community property even though the definition of what property falls to
the community and what property remains separate differs widely among the states. See
WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK

& MICHAEL J. VAUGHN,

PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY

PROPERTY § 56, at 96 (2d ed. 1971). Many common-law states have equitable
distribution statutes that may deprive the husband of some of his property in the case of
divorce. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(c) (McKinney 1986).
65. For example, the bankruptcy estate includes all interests of the debtor's spouse in
community property; it does not include interests of other persons in other property, for
example, tenancies in common. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2) (1994).
66. In states that recognize the tenancy by the entirety, the IRS cannot levy against
property held as tenants by the entirety to satisfy the tax obligations of one of the
spouses. See United States v. Gurley, 415 F.2d 144, 149 (5th Cir. 1969); Talbot v. United
States, 850 F. Supp. 969, 975 (D. Wyo. 1994); cf United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677,
719-20 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (analogizing from
tax liens on property held as tenants by the entirety to tax liens on property subject to a
homestead exemption).
67. A married person can invoke the privilege of spousal immunity to prevent his
spouse from testifying against him. See FED. R. EVID. 501.
68. An employee is required to receive his pension in the form of a joint and survivor
pension unless he elects otherwise and his spouse joins in the election. See I.R.C. § 417
(West Supp. 1998).
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The marriage penalty arising from the rate structure affects a
minority of couples. Most are not affected because even their
combined incomes do not reach the level at which the rate
graduations begin. In 1996, the joint return taxed all taxable income
up to $40,100 at the 15% rate.7 ' The median household income in
1996 was $35,492.72 A more precise figure from the IRS sews up the
point: In 1994, roughly 67 million of the 93 million returns showing
taxable income paid tax only at the 15% rate.73 Thus, no couple in
the lower 70% of the income spectrum is affected by the rate
structure. 74
The problem arises for couples earning incomes that are
substantially higher than the median household income. Within that
group, the problem is most serious for couples in which the spouses
earn approximately the same incomes. Thus, it is not surprising that
more than half the returns showing penalties reported adjusted gross
incomes over $50,000, while more than half of the returns showing
marriage bonuses reported adjusted gross incomes under $50,000. 7'
C. The MarriageBonus
The joint return favors families in which most or all the income
is earned by one of the spouses. If C and D have taxable incomes of
$50,000 and $0 respectively when they marry, C will pay substantially
less tax when married than when single. C and D pay exactly the
same tax as A and B who suffered a marriage penalty above, even
though the contributions of the spouses differ. Many of the critical

69. There are vestiges of the doctrine of interspousal immunity for torts in many
jurisdictions. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895F (1965).
70. Standards for formation and enforcement of premarital agreements are much
more stringent than for agreements between unrelated parties or between parents and
adult children. See UNIF. PREMARrrAL AGREEMENT ACT §§ 2-6, 9B U.L.A. 372-76
(1983).
71. See I.R.C. § 1(c) (1994); Rev. Proc. 95-53, 1995-2 C.B. 445,446 tbl.1.
72. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 12, at vii tbl.A. Household income is a
gross income figure that will exceed the same household's taxable income by a substantial
amount.
73. See Therese Cruciano, Individual Income Tax Rates and Tax Shares, 1994, IRS
STAT. INCOME BULL., Spring 1997, at 7,25 tbl.1.
74. All couples are adversely affected by the loss of part of the standard deduction on
the joint return. In 1996, A and B would have had standard deductions of $4150 each on
single returns and only $6900 on a joint return. See I.R.C. § 63(c) (1994) (amended 1997).
This effect operates purely as a tax penalty for marriage and is independent of the source
of the couple's income, although it can produce a marriage bonus if the wife has no
income.
75. See CBO, supranote 57, at 31 tbl.5.
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tax theorists consider this to be a problem.76
The critical tax theorists have us compare two families: Family
A in which the husband and wife each earn $25,000, and Family C in
which the husband earns $50,000 and the wife does not work outside
the home.77 Clearly, they say, Family C is better off because the wife
can perform a range of household services for which Family A must
pay. Therefore, the argument goes, these two families are not
comparable, and there is no reason why their taxes should be the
same.
This argument fails for several reasons. First, it is not true in
most situations that Family A will hire others to perform the
necessary household services. In moderate-income families, the
spouses still will cook, vacuum, and do laundry. These tasks may
leave them with less time to relax, but the work will be done and for
the most part without paying any outsider to do it. So Family A and
Family C really differ in their amount of leisure time.
Second, this argument requires the taxation of imputed income
from services. Even if Family C is better off, it is only because of the
value of the services performed by the wife. Taxing Family C on the
value of her services runs against the principle that taxpayers are not
taxed on the value of the services they perform for themselves. It is
true that people who repair their cars or cook gourmet meals for
themselves are better off than those who must pay for such services,
but the value of these services is hardly a feasible addition to the tax
base. 78 A taxpayer should not be taxed on the value of an oil change
when he performs that work on his own car.
Third, accepting again the argument that Family A is worse off
because it will have to pay for household services, consider Family E,
in which the husband earns $50,000 and the wife earns $0. The wife
in Family E cannot or will not perform household services. Family E
is forced to pay outsiders to perform these tasks. Family E is in the
same position as Family A, which must also pay for the household
76. See MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 20; Christian, supra note 1, at 279; Moran &
Whitford, supra note 1, at 800.
77. See MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 12-13; Blumberg, supra note 1, at 58-59, Gann,
supra note 1, at 28; Davis, supra note 1, at 207.
78. Even the tax theorists who suggest taxing imputed income from the use of homes
and consumer durables, for example, cars, throw up their hands at the thought of taxing
homeowners for cutting their own grass. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOSEPH
BANKMAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 121-22 (11th ed. 1997). There also is a
slippery slope problem with this approach: If Family C is taxed on the value of the wife's
services, how about the grass-cutting services performed by the teenage son? Or the
daughter's services babysitting her younger siblings?
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services. Taxing Family E like Family C because the wife could have
performed household services is even worse than taxing imputed
income. It would be taxing imputed imputed income. A taxpayer
should certainly not be taxed on the value of an oil change because
he could change the oil in his car even though he does not.
These points fit together: Family C and Family E both differ
from Family A in having more leisure time. The added tax liability,
then, is a tax on sleeping, watching TV, playing with the children,
knitting, or just loafing! There is, of course, the possibility that the
wife in Family E cannot perform household services because of ill
health, in which case the added tax on Family E would be a tax on
Mrs. E's misery.
D. Effect on Women's Work Outside the Home
1. Theory
Adding the wife's income to the husband's income results in its
being taxed at the higher rates applicable to their combined incomes,
which reduces the after-tax return on the wife's income and reduces
her incentive to work.79 (The same fact can be used to argue that the

income tax discourages marriage, but there are few data on this
point,"0 and most critical tax authors do not take this path.) This
analysis is correct, but this is a problem only if we accept the premises
that (1) women working outside the home should be a major social
goal, and (2) marriage should be tax-neutral.
The discrimination against the second earner is a natural
consequence of the progressive rate structure in which any additional
income will be taxed at the marginal rate determined by the income
already being earned. The same argument applies to a single
taxpayer taking a second job or investing; the additional income will
be taxed at the marginal rate determined by the taxpayer's primary
employment. If we are serious about wanting the population to be
fully employed-two jobs if the first does not occupy enough time or

79. See, e.g., MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 20.
80. See CBO, supra note 57, at 12-14. Economists have investigated this question.
See David L. Sjoquist & Mary Beth Walker, The Marriage Tax and Rate and Timing of
Marriage,48 NAT'L TAX J. 547, 556 (1995) (arguing that the marriage tax does not affect
the rate of marriage, but does affect the timing of marriage); see also James Aim & Leslie
A. Whittington, Does the Income Tax Affect Marital Decisions?, 48 NAT'L TAX J. 565,
565-66 (1995) (commenting on methodological issues in Sjoquist and Walker's article and
concluding that the overall effect of tax considerations on the marriage rate was to reduce
it slightly).
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produce enough income-and to invest for the future, then we should
adopt a system of separate filing for each job and for each
investment.
2. Empirical Research
Many economists focus on efficiency, which requires that taxes
distort behavior as little as possible. They note that the combination
of the high marginal rate of tax on the first dollar of the wife's
compensation, the FICA tax, and the nondeductibility of expenses
such as child care and work clothing, discourage paid work by wives.
According to economic theory, this disincentive represents a loss to
the economy.8 '
This economic theory has been put to empirical test. Feldstein
and Feenberg showed that, assuming high elasticities for women's
work, the combination of the first dollar being taxed at 28% (rather
than 15%) and the FICA tax creates a very large deadweight loss to
the economy. 82 They simulated the economic effect of various
remedies, such as second-earner deductions, exemption of wives from
the FICA tax, a lower rate on the second earner, and mandatory
individual returns. All of these proposals resulted in substantial
revenue losses. In all but one of the simulations, a revenue loss of
one dollar reduced deadweight loss to the economy by less than one
dollar. Of particular interest here, the simulations showed that a
15% rate on the second earner would reduce the deadweight loss by
61 to 69 cents per dollar of lost revenue; a 20% rate on the second
earner would reduce the deadweight loss by 71 to 77 cents per dollar
of lost revenue. 83 These trade-offs do not appear to be beneficial.
The only simulation that produced substantial reductions in the
deadweight loss without a major revenue loss was mandatory
individual returns with rate adjustments to maintain revenue
neutrality. Revenue neutrality resulted from income taxes (at lower
81. This analysis, like most of the efficiency economics, depends on the assumption
that people are better off if the money economy is larger. A non-economist might doubt
this. According to this logic, we would be better off if all housewives were forced into the
market economy: Mrs. A would now perform household services for pay in the Bs' home
while Mrs. B performed household services for pay in the As' home. The fallacy, of
course, is the underlying assumption that anyone or anything not earning a cash return is
not contributing to the welfare of society. That assumption is true as to idle factories and
probably true as to unemployed young men, but is clearly untrue as to housewives.
82. See Martin Feldstein & Daniel R. Feenberg, The Taxation of Two-Earner
Families, in EMPIRIcAL FOUNDATIONS OF HOUSEHOLD TAXATION 39, 40-43 (Martin
Feldstein & James M. Poterba eds., 1996).

83. See id. at 68-69.
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rates but on a larger base) and Social Security taxes on women who
joined the workforce as a result of the tax changes and higher taxes
on other workers, thereby offsetting the reduction in taxes on women
already in the workforce." In practice, this individual filing scheme
would probably work out fairly equally for many couples. If both are
now working, he would pay more tax, but she would pay less, and
they would end up about where they are now. If she is not now
working, the spouses would have additional income to the extent of
the wife's earnings net of taxes, which in many cases would be only
the FICA tax, offset by the additional taxes on the husband's income.
It would presumably increase taxes on single taxpayers and married
taxpayers where one spouse earned most or all the income.
E. Solutions to the MarriagePenalty
1. Higher Tax Rates for Men
While Professors Moran and Whitford are ambivalent about
whether to change the Code provisions that benefit traditional
families because these same provisions may benefit blacks in the
future, 5 Professor McCaffery has no doubts that any provision
benefiting the traditional family should be eliminated. In his view,
the traditional family perpetuates the burden of patriarchy that still
burdens women. 6
a. Theory
To solve these problems, Professor McCaffery proposes a higher
rate of tax on the income of married men, which will discourage them
from working and encourage them to stay home with the children,
and a lower rate of tax on the income of married women, which will
encourage them to enter the work force.87 The idea of taxing married
men at higher rates is founded in the theory of optimal taxation,
which hypothesizes efficiency gains from taxing the least elastic
goods at the highest rates.8 Although taxes will change the relative
84. See id. at 62-63 tbl.2.3, 69-71. Although they were not able to deal precisely with
the allocation of property income and deductions between the spouses' returns because of
limitations of the data, Feldstein and Feenberg approximated the results by splitting these
items between the two returns. See id. at 69.
85. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 1, at 782,783,798.
86. See MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, passim.
87. See id. at 5, 192-94.
88. See, e.g., J.A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income
Taxation, 38 REv. ECON. STUD. 175, 207-08 (1971); F.P. Ramsey, A Contribution to the
Theory of Taxation, 37 ECON. J. 47,58-59 (1927).
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production of goods from what it would have been in a no-tax world,
the changes will be the smallest-and therefore the least inefficientif the inelastic goods are taxed heavily and the highly elastic goods
are taxed lightly. According to the data that Professor McCaffery
cites, married men are almost completely inelastic with respect to
employment. 9 Married women, on the other hand, are highly elastic
with respect to employment. 0 Therefore, men should be taxed at
higher rates, and women at lower rates.

b. A Small Problem
There are also unmarried men and women. Unmarried women
do not face the tax problems that concern Professor McCaffery, so
there is no reason to make them beneficiaries of the lower rates.
Their elasticity as to work is probably lower than that of married
women because they do not have husbands on whom to depend for
support. 91 Applying the rationale of optimal taxation to complete the
tax scheme stated above would lead to taxing single women at higher
rates than married women, although not as high as those for married
men.

More seriously, what about unmarried men? Their elasticity of
employment is substantially higher than that of married men. 92 The
89. See MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 179-82.
90. See Nada Eissa, Labor Supply and the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, in
EMPIRICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HOUSEHOLD TAXATION, supra note 82, at 5, 6 (estimating
elasticity of .79 for upper income women). This obviously overstates the elasticity for all
women; low-income women presumably have low elasticity because they are forced to
work.
91. I have not found any study measuring the elasticity of single women with respect
to employment, but the propensity to work can be deduced from the actual employment
figures. The rates of participation in the workforce for women by age and marital status
are:
WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN THE WORKFORCE

MARITAL
STATUS

Single
Married

20-24
72.9%
64.7%

AGE
25-34
80.2%
72.0%

35-44
79.5%
75.7%

45-64
67.3%
62.7%

See 1996 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 22, at 399 tbl.624 (1995 figures).
92. I have not found any study that has measured the elasticity of unmarried men
with respect to employment, but it is clear from their much lower rate of participation in
the workforce that unmarried men do not feel the same compulsion to work that married
men feel. See Howard V. Hayghe & Steven E. Haugen, Profiles of Husbands in Today's
Labor Market, MONTHLY LAB. REv., Oct. 1987, at 12, 13. This lower rate of
participation is shown in the following table:
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optimal tax argument for taxing men more heavily fails when applied
to unmarried men. A heavy tax where there is a high elasticity will
produce substantial, and in this case, very serious, changes in
behavior: Unmarried men will not work or will not work any more
than necessary to survive.
The problems of unemployed men, especially unemployed young
men, are serious, for themselves and for society. Deprived of work
and its socializing benefits, young men can fall into lives of idleness
and crime.93 Of course, this problem can be easily solved by taxing
unmarried men at lower rates in order to encourage them to work.
Although unmarried men are more likely to participate in the
workforce than are unmarried women, the social consequences of
their not participating are much more serious, which justifies a rate of
tax on their incomes lower than that on the incomes of unmarried
women.
Consider the tax system that would emerge from all this
theorizing:

MEN'S PARTICIPATION IN THE WORKFORCE (1987)
AGE

MARITAL
STATUS

Married
Never

All Ages

16-24

25-34

35-44

45-54

78.5%
71.7%

95.3%
65.2%

97.1%
88.0%

96.2%
83.7%

93.7%
71.7%

Married

Not
Married

67.9%
I

87.6%
I

92.9%
I

91.1%
I_

86.1%
II

See id. at 13 tbl.1. The more recent figures shown in the following table substantiate
lower rates of labor force participation for single men.
MEN'S PARTICIPATION IN THE WORKFORCE (1995)

MARITAL
STATUS

Single
Married

20-24
80.2%
94.9%

AGE
25-34
88.7%
96.3%

35-44
81.4%
95.4%

45-64
67.0%
82.4%

See 1996 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supranote 22, at 399 tbl.624 (1995 figures).
93. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE

NEW URBAN POOR (1996) (chronicling the social disintegration of a Southside Chicago
neighborhood arising from the widespread unemployment of young men); see also
Tomorrow's Second Sex, ECONOMIST, Sept. 28, 1996, at 23 (discussing the growing social
problem of uneducated, unmarried, and unemployed men).
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RATE STRUCTURE OF A TAX SYSTEM BASED ON ELASTICITY
Unmarried

Married

Men

Lowest Tax Rates

Highest Tax Rates

Women

Higher Tax Rates

Low Tax Rates

It is hard to imagine beneficial social results arising from such a tax
94
rate structure.

2. The Earned Income Tax Credit
There is one area in which the marriage penalty is both severe
and avoidable without fundamental damage to the tax system. Lowincome couples face a drastic reduction in the earned income tax
credit when they marry. This reduction occurs because they are
required to file joint returns, the credit is phased out as adjusted
gross income increases, and the phase-out is the same for single
persons and married persons.9 5 Thus, adding a spouse's income to

the taxpayer's income is likely to cause the taxpayer to lose a large
part of the earned income tax credit to the phase-out. This problem

should be eliminated because the persons eligible for the earned
income tax credit are in dire economic straits even with the credit and
because marriage should be encouraged especially in this economic
stratum.
Individual returns could solve this problem. There would be few

problems of assigning property income or deductions among couples
at this income level. 96 Individual returns, however, present a serious
problem, which I will call the "surgeon's wife" problem. If a benefit
is phased out for taxpayers with high incomes, the surgeon will
94. It is interesting to note that the above rate structure would reinforce the
biological tendencies of the sexes: marriage for women, and bachelorhood for men.
These tendencies result, biologists now believe, because women seek long-term
commitment to aid them in their long-term commitment to their children, while men seek
only to spread their seed as widely as possible. See James Q. Wilson, On Gender, PUB.
INTEREST, Summer 1993, at 3, 5, 7. Given the widely accepted social benefits of
marriage, it would be odd to see a tax system that would give men yet another incentive
to avoid long-term commitment and that would add tax insult to psychic injury for single
women.
95. See I.R.C. § 32(b), (d) (West Supp. 1998).
96. The only deductions likely to apply to these taxpayers would be the deductions
allowed in arriving at adjusted gross income because the other deductions are not likely to
exceed the standard deduction. Alimony and perhaps the moving expense deduction are
the only deductions that come to mind for taxpayers in these income ranges. Moreover,
the earned income tax credit is eliminated for taxpayers with more than $2200 of
investment income during the year. See id. § 32(i).
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obviously not receive the benefit. But his wife might if she earns a
small salary and the benefit is determined with respect to her salary
only. The surgeon's wife problem will arise if the taxpayer's
eligibility for the earned income tax credit is completely independent
from the income of her spouse.
There are better ways to solve the problem, the most
straightforward of which would be to adjust the phase-out for
married couples so that it starts much higher. Starting the phase-out
at twice the current level would make the earned income tax credit
marriage-neutralY7 This solution would not be very costly. 9 It would
perhaps stir resentment among other taxpayers who saw substantial
earned income tax credits being given to people with adjusted gross
incomes in excess of $40,000. 99
To prevent the political backlash that might result from having
such relatively high income taxpayers receiving the earned income
tax credit, it would be better to increase the starting point of the
phase-out on a joint return to something less than twice the starting
point of the phase-out on a single return. This would also be justified
by the idea that the needs of a married couple with children are
greater than those of a single person with children, but not twice as
great because of economies of scale in housing and food. In the § 1
rate schedules, the first two joint return brackets are 60% wider than
the single return brackets. 10 There is nothing magic about that
number, but it is not a bad trade-off among the competing interests.
IV. MANDATORY INDIVIDUAL FILING

A. Not Theoretically Justified
The usual recommendation to avoid the problems of the
97. See id. § 32(b)(2). If the phase-out amount were exactly twice the phase-out
amount in effect now, two individuals receiving the maximum earned income tax credit
with earned income (or adjusted gross income) exactly equal to the phase-out amount
could marry and still not lose any of the earned income tax credit by reason of the phaseout.
98. See CBO, supra note 57, at xviii tbl.4 (showing that starting the earned income tax
credit phase-out for married couples at twice the current level would result in revenue
loss of $4 billion and reduce the total marriage penalty by 12%, and that 41% of the
benefits from so raising the phase-out would inure to taxpayers with incomes below

$20,000).
99. The completed phase-out amount applicable in 1998 is $30,095. See Rev. Proc.
97-57, 1997-52 I.R.B. 20,22. If doubled phase-out amounts applied to married taxpayers,
a couple with earned income of $60,000 would receive a credit-albeit a very small one.
100. See I.R.C. § 1(a), (c) (West Supp. 1998).
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marriage penalty is mandatory individual filing.10 1 This Part of this
Section will argue that mandatory individual filing is no more
justifiable on equity grounds than joint filing. The next Part of this
Section will argue that mandatory single filing would add a major
level of complexity to the tax system.
Changing to a system of mandatory individual filing would
replace one disincentive with another. For example, husband and
wife, both employed at salaries of $50,000 each, confront the
husband's promotion to a new job at a salary of $100,000, which will
require the couple to move. The move will cost the wife her job, and
the time demands of the husband's new job will make it impractical
for the wife to work. Under the present joint filing system, this is a
tax-neutral decision for the couple. Under single filing, there would
be a substantial tax penalty for accepting the promotion.
Individual filing would present other inequities. Consider F and
G, both working in their first jobs at $25,000 each. F now marries H,
who earns $100,000. F and G would still pay the same tax. Unless F
unwisely has chosen a spouse who refuses to share his income with
her, it is not plausible to argue that Fs ability to pay remains the
same as G's. Will G be satisfied when told that the individual filing
system prevents H from obtaining a marriage bonus?
Consider J, single with $50,000 taxable income, vis-h-vis K and
L, married to each other, each with $25,000 taxable income. Under
the joint return system, J pays more than K and L. If K and L are
allowed to file individual returns and thereby reduce their marriage
penalty, J will pay much more than they do unless there is a major
flattening of the rates in conjunction with the change to mandatory
individual filing.
The problem with this whole subject is that inequity can be
found in any system depending on what perspective is used. The
table below shows in brief form how various single persons (Si, S2,
and S3) and married couples (Hi and W1, H2 and W2, and H3 and
W3) fare under joint returns and individual returns. The table
assumes that there are no differences in standard deductions or
personal exemptions depending on marital status. The table shows
that there would be many opportunities to complain about unfair tax
burdens under individual filing.

101. See MCCAFFERY, supranote 1, at 278; Moran & Whitford, supra note 1, at 798.

1709

CRITICAL TAX THEORY

1998]

COMPARISON OF TAX BURDENS OF JOINT RETURNS AND

INDIVIDUAL RETURNS

1

2

3

H

$50,000

$25,000

$25,000

W
S

$0
$50,000

$25,000
$50,000

$25,000
$25,000

Joint

Individual

H1W1 = H2W2

H1 + W1 > H2 + W2

S1 > HIW1

S1 = H1 + W1

S2 > H2W2

S2 >> H2 + W2

H3* > S3

S3 = H3 = W3

= means "pays same tax as"

> means "pays more tax than"
>> means "pays much more tax than"
* Assumes that H3 is liable for one-half the combined tax liability.

This

illustrates the marriage penalty: H and W pay more tax after marriage than

before.

B.

Implementing MandatoryIndividualReturns
The topic of mandatory individual returns deserves detailed

treatment because it is regarded as a panacea by so many writers
criticizing the tax law as unfair to some taxpayers on account of their
race or their sex.1 02 Most of these writers simply state that the
problem of discrimination against women can be solved by a
mandatory individual return system and do not consider the practical
problems of individual returns for married persons. 0 3 The discussion
102- See MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 278; Blumberg, supra note 1, at 54-55; Moran
& Whitford, supra note 1, at 795; Davis, supra note 1, at 218-19, 236-38.
103. See Blumberg, supra note 1, at 95 (noting that the aggregation of spousal income
should be abandoned in favor of individual taxation for all wage earners without
addressing the problems of such a system); Brown, supra note 1, at 54 (concluding that
the marriage penalty should be eliminated without analysis of how to do so); Christian,
supra note 1, at 355-63 (discussing second-earner credit, higher tax rates for married men,
and mandatory individual filing); Gann, supra note 1, at 32, 51-52 (stating that the
elimination of marital status should be abandoned in favor of individual taxation for all
wage earners without addressing the problems of such a system); Davis, supra note 1, at
238-48 (acknowledging problems of allocating unearned income, especially when the wife
does not actually share in benefits of unearned income, but lacking discussion of
deductions not related to property). But see Alstott, supra note 1, at 2031-32 (pointing
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here focuses on the joint return and does not consider the broader
issue of true marriage neutrality.
Professor Zelenak, who has made a serious effort at working out
the practical problems of an individual return system, admits that the
simplicity of the joint return system is one of the strongest arguments
for retaining it."°4 He believes, however, that workable solutions can
be developed for the problems presented by an individual return
system. He identifies two categories of problems: (1) assigning the
itemized (or standard) deductions, personal credits, and personal
exemptions to one of the spouses; and (2) assigning the income from
property to one of the spouses. 105
1. Personal Deductions, Credits, and Exemptions
Professor Zelenak concludes that there are two equally
satisfactory ways of dealing with the deductions: (1) assigning all the
personal deductions to the spouse with the higher income until the
spouses' incomes are equal and then splitting the deductions equally;
or (2) prorating the personal deductions between the spouses in
proportion to their incomes.

6

Professor Zelenak's proposal would work well for the simple
deductions, for example, the home mortgage interest deduction on
the family home. Either proration or allocation to the higher-earning
spouse would be simple and produce rough justice. Despite his
thoughtful efforts, problems remain because not all of the itemized
deductions are simple deductions.'"
Many of the itemized
deductions and credits are subject to various limits and restrictions
that make it less clear to whom the deduction should be assigned. 08
There are three categories of limits and restrictions: (1)
thresholds, (2) phase-outs, and (3) deductions that appear to call for
assignment by rules other than those proposed by Professor Zelenak.
Thresholds allow a deduction only to the extent it exceeds a
out that individual filing would likely enhance women's market work but would be
detrimental to women as caregivers).
104. See Zelenak, supranote 1, at 381.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 393.
107. If I thought that the adoption of individual filing might lead to simplification of
the itemized deductions, I might be more favorably inclined toward it.
108. At the time Professor Zelenak was writing, the main problem was the itemized
deductions. After the enactment of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34,
1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. (111 Stat.) 788, the issue of personal credits is important. See, e.g.,
I.R.C. § 24 (West Supp. 1998) (child tax credit); id. § 25A (Hope Scholarship and Lifetime
Learning Credits).
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threshold. The rationale for thresholds is generally to screen out
small items for administrative reasons and sometimes for revenue
reasons."9 Phase-outs reduce a credit or deduction as the taxpayer's
income increases over some specified amount in order to deny the
benefit to high income taxpayers. Finally, some deductions, for
example, alimony, should not be apportioned.
a.

Thresholds

The casualty loss deduction illustrates the operation of a
threshold rule. Casualty losses are limited, first, to the excess of each
loss over $100, and, second, to the excess of the aggregate remaining
loss over 10% of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income." 0 The best
way to assign this deduction is not clear. Consider H and W, earning
$80,000 and $20,000, respectively. W suffers $6000 uninsured damage
to her car. Assigning the whole deduction to the higher-earning
spouse, H, seems wrongheaded; it was W's car, and she might have
paid for the car from her earnings. Assigning the whole deduction to
H does not maximize the tax benefit; it deprives the spouses of any
income tax benefit because the damage does not exceed 10% of H's
adjusted gross income. If the rule is proration in proportion to their
incomes, the conceptual problem of W's owning the car disappears
because title is irrelevant in a proration system. The spouses,
however, still do not receive any income tax benefit because the
$1200 casualty loss prorated to W ($20,000/$100,000 x $6000) will not
exceed 10% of her adjusted gross income, and the reduced casualty
loss prorated to H will not exceed 10% of his adjusted gross income.
On the other hand, if the tax consequences follow the title to the
car, then W may be entitled to some deduction because the loss
exceeds 10% of her adjusted gross income. Following title seems
most consistent with a marriage-neutral tax system; that is, it leaves
W where she would have been if not married. This system would not
present serious compliance or administrative problems because the
spouses would have title documents proving the ownership of the
kinds of major items (for example, cars, boats, homes) that can give
rise to casualty losses large enough to pass the thresholds described
above. Taxpayers would find it difficult to game the system by
throwing all casualty losses onto the return of the lower-income
109. The threshold for the medical expense deduction was increased in the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 133, 100 Stat. 2085, 2116 (codified at I.R.C.
§ 213(a) (West Supp. 1998)). This was done to raise revenue. See H.R. REP. No. 99-841,
at 866 tbl.A.2 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4075,4954.
110. See I.R.C. § 165(h) (West Supp. 1998).
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spouse unless they can predict accurately which items of property will
be subject to casualty.
The medical expense deduction is another example of a
deduction subject to a threshold. This deduction is limited to the
excess over 7.5% of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income."' The
medical expense deduction, unlike the other itemized deductions, is
allowed to the taxpayer with respect to expenditures for the benefit
of other persons if the other persons are dependents." That means
that a liability test would not be appropriate here, but a payment test
would be consistent with current law. Either of Professor Zelenak's
proposed rules often will deny the taxpayer the benefit of the
deduction because the expense will not exceed 7.5% of adjusted gross
income of the spouse to whom it is allocated or apportioned. Unlike
the casualty loss deduction where taxpayers will have some difficulty
in shifting the deduction to the lower-income spouse, a payment rule
would allow taxpayers to shift the medical expense deduction to the
lower-income spouse to get past the 7.5% of adjusted gross income
threshold, or, in a few cases, to the higher-earning spouse to take
advantage of the excess over 7.5% of adjusted gross income against
higher tax rates.
b. Phase-Outs
Phase-outs abound in the Code, especially after the passage of
the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. They exist primarily to deny
benefits to high-income taxpayers. The phase-outs usually require
taxpayers to file joint returns as a means of solving the surgeon's wife
problem. Some of the critical tax theorists may believe that the
surgeon's wife does not present a problem-after all, her work will
liberate her from patriarchy and that will presumably justify the
benefit."' But it is unlikely that Congress or the public at large will
accept this.
To illustrate the issues, consider the child credit created by the
1997 Act."4 A taxpayer is allowed a $500 credit ($400 in 1998) for
each dependent child under the age of seventeen, but the credit is
111. Seeid. § 213(a).
112. The dependents need only be dependents as defined by the more-than-halfsupport and relationship tests. See id. § 152(a). It is not necessary that the taxpayer
actually be allowed a dependency exemption for the person. See id. § 213(a) (referring to
the definition of "dependent" in I.R.C. § 152, rather than to I.R.C. § 151, which allows the
dependency exemption).
113. See, e.g., McCAFFERY, supranote 1, at 159.
114. See I.R.C. § 24 (West Supp. 1998) (added by Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L.
No. 105-34, § 101(a), 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. (111 Stat.) 788, 796-98).
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reduced by $50 for each $1000 of the taxpayer's modified adjusted
gross income in excess of $110,000.115 Thus, a taxpayer with modified
adjusted gross income of $120,000 (or more) would see his $500
credit reduced by 10 times $50, and therefore would be allowed no
credit.
In an individual return system, the phase-out would affect the
spouses differently depending on their relative incomes. If the $500
credit were divided between the spouses in proportion to their
incomes, the result would favor couples with an exactly equal division
of income, who are, interestingly, the very couples treated worst by
the rate structure. Assuming that the starting point of the phase-out
for single taxpayers now in the law ($75,000) would apply in an
individual return system, H and W could each have $75,000 modified
adjusted gross income and not suffer from the phase-out. The family
would have $150,000 modified adjusted gross income and a $500 child
credit for each child under age seventeen. As the incomes of the
spouses diverge from equality, the amount of credit will be reduced,
for example, if H has modified adjusted gross income of $85,000, and
W of $65,000, he will be allowed no credit-the family will still have
$150,000 modified adjusted gross income, but only W will have a
credit. If the credit were prorated, it would be approximately $217
($500 x 65/150) for each child under age seventeen.
It is not clear, however, that the credit should be prorated.
Because a credit is a direct offset against the tax liability, the benefit
of a credit does not depend on the taxpayer's marginal rate, which
suggests that the credit should be divided equally between the
taxpayers. In that case, W will have a credit of $250, but H, of course,
will still be phased out. Equal division of the credit has two
problems: (1) it is less advantageous than proration if the lowerearning spouse has tax liability less than $250 (unless the higherearning spouse is fully phased out); and (2) the surgeon's wife
problem re-emerges.
No matter how the $500 credit is divided between the spouses'
individual returns, the above results are inconsistent with the demand
of horizontal equity that similarly situated taxpayers be treated
similarly. Many couples in which the higher-earning spouse is phased
out would regard it as unfair that they receive less than the $500
credit available to another couple with the same income earned
equally by the spouses.
Professor Zelenak's other proposed rule-assigning the credit to
115. See id. § 24(b)(1), (b)(2)(A).
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the higher-earning spouse-would be disastrous to high-income
taxpayers, as it would eliminate the credit whenever the higherearning spouse had modified adjusted gross income of $85,000 or
more.
The phase-outs on the Hope Scholarship Credit and Lifetime
Learning Credit" 6 would operate in much the same way, even though
the phase-outs start at different levels. The rule defining the base of
these credits, "qualified tuition and related expenses," would
presumably be modified to include only expenses of the taxpayer and
the taxpayer's dependents, deleting the expenses of the taxpayer's
spouse from the base of the credit. If this change were not made, a
wife could claim the Lifetime Learning Credit for the educational
expenses incurred by her husband if his income made him ineligible
for the credit.
The credit for a child's education expenses could be assigned
using either of Professor Zelenak's proposed rules. For high-income
taxpayers, the apportionment in accordance with income rule would
be much more beneficial because assigning it to the higher-income
spouse would almost always lead to a complete phase-out. A payor
rule would be costly to the Treasury; the lower-income spouse would
always pay the education expenses (at least up to the amounts taken
into account for the credit) in cases where she was not completely
phased out.
The rate of the child care credit is reduced from 30% to 20% as
the taxpayer's adjusted gross income increases over $10,000.117
Married couples are required to file joint returns in order to qualify
for the credit."' If there were no joint returns, the credit reduction
could depend on the wife's income, the husband's income, or on the
payor's income. The rationale of the credit-to offset some of the
additional expenses incurred by the second earner-suggests that the
credit should be allowed to the second earner and based on her
income. This again presents a variation of the surgeon's wife
problem, which could be solved by some limit based on the income of
the taxpayer's spouse.
The use of phase-outs is not limited to credits. Itemized
deductions (except medical, casualty losses, and investment
interest-all of which have their own serious limits) are phased out as

116. See iL § 25A (added by Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 § 201(a), 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(111 Stat.) at 788, 799-803).
117. See id. § 21(a)(2).
118. See id. § 21(e)(2).
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the taxpayer's adjusted gross income increases over $100,000
(indexed)." 9 If the $100,000 applicable amount remained in effect in
a mandatory individual return system, many taxpayers who now
suffer from the phase-out of itemized deductions would avoid or
reduce the phase-out by shifting some income to their spouses'
returns. There would be some revenue cost to this change, but any
reduction in the complications introduced into the Code by § 68
would be welcome. 120
c.

Deductions Calling for Other Rules of Assignment

Presumably the alimony deduction would be allocated to the
payor. It would be strange indeed to allow the second wife a part of
the husband's deduction for alimony paid to his first wife.
Among the itemized deductions is the deduction for investment
interest, which is deductible to the extent of the taxpayer's net
investment income.' 2 ' This deduction should surely be allocated in its
entirety to the owner of the property-or to both spouses if the
property is jointly owned-to avoid the anomaly of including the
income from the investment property in the owner's income and not
allowing him to deduct all the expense attributable to the property.
It would also be difficult to determine the taxpayer's net investment
income if this and other investment expenses were not allocated by
ownership.
The moving expense deduction presents an interesting situation.
This is not an itemized deduction, but is allowed in computing
adjusted gross income.'21 There is no income limitation, but there are
strict rules about distance of the new residence from the former job3
and the time the taxpayer must be employed at the new residence.12
When H and W move to a new city, who should be allowed the
deduction? While income-producing deductions would be allocated
to the owner of the income, the moving expense deduction is not tied
to any particular income. Rather, it is contingent on being employed
at the new residence for specified periods.
It would be possible to allow the deduction to the payor of the

119. See id. § 68.

120. See Calvin W. Johnson, Simplification: Replacement of the Section 68 Limitation
on Itemized Deductions,78 TAX NOTES 89, 89 (1998).
121. See I.R.C. § 163(d) (West Supp. 1998).
122. See id. § 62(a)(15). Because this deduction is a deduction from gross income and
is not subject to any limits or thresholds, it will always benefit the taxpayer at his marginal
rate.
123. See id. § 217(c).
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expenses, to the spouse who satisfies the distance and work
requirements (or divide it if both satisfy the work requirements), or
to prorate it. Each of these possibilities presents problems. Allowing
the deduction to the payor would put a premium on planning. If both
spouses satisfy the work requirement, proration might be fairest, but
proration would sometimes be inconsistent with the rationale of the
deduction. For example, suppose H has $10,000 earned income and
$90,000 investment income, W has $25,000 employment income, and
they move to a new residence where she works and he does not. H
will be apportioned 80% of the moving expense deduction even
though he would not be allowed any moving expense deduction on
his own. This is one situation in which allocating the entire deduction
to the spouse with the most earned income would be most beneficial
to the spouses when both qualify.
Taxpayers are allowed to deduct state and local income taxes
and property taxes as itemized deductions.124 Proration in proportion
to income would be an appropriate way to assign the deduction for
state and local income taxes between the spouses, because that would
approximate the amounts each paid. Proration of the property tax
deduction on the personal residence is more doubtful. It might be
owned separately by one of the spouses, in which case proration is
not appropriate. If it is owned jointly, the spouses' equal shares of
the property tax liability will not be reflected in the deduction unless
their incomes are equal.
If the itemized deduction for property taxes is prorated while the
deduction for business property is assigned to the owner, mixed-use
property will be subject to both rules. Consider the beach condo
owned by the husband, used partly by the family and partly for rental
purposes. The taxpayers would find that the property taxes assigned
by I.R.C. § 280A to their personal use would be prorated between
them, while the property taxes assigned by I.R.C. § 280A to the
rental use of the property would be assigned entirely to the husband.
This is not a technical tax problem, but it will be hard to explain to
the taxpayers and is unlikely to raise their regard for the income tax
as a sensible and fair method of raising revenue.
It might seem that the problems pointed out here are of no
consequence because in many cases the thresholds and phase-outs
will deny the deductions and credits to taxpayers on individual
returns in situations in which they would not be allowed on joint

124. See id § 164(a)(1)-(3).
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returns.125 That may be true, but if the goal of individual returns is to

reflect accurately the individual taxpayer's ability to pay, then it is
inconsistent to inject into the determination of the tax any factors

relating to another taxpayer.126 Further, there will be horizontal
inequities as couples with similar combined incomes face different

tax liabilities arising from the operation of the thresholds and phaseouts.
In general, allocating all the itemized deductions to the higher-

earning spouse on the grounds that doing so maximizes the spouses'
welfare will sometimes have the opposite result, depriving the

taxpayers of a deduction or credit because the higher earner's income
runs afoul of a threshold or phase-out. Prorating the deductions in
proportion to the spouses' incomes works better in some cases,
although it would not reflect the reality of their economic
arrangements.

An academic response to the above might be that the various
thresholds and phase-outs are not themselves justified by tax policy

and that they should be eliminated in an income tax free of sex
discrimination. This is not likely to happen. Congress seems ever

more enamored of thresholds, phase-outs, and offsets. 127 If policy
recommendations are to be taken seriously, they must cope with the
realities of the present tax law.
The preceding examination of the various itemized (and other
personal) deductions reveals that neither proration between the

spouses nor allocation to the higher-earning spouse is completely
satisfactory. It is obviously possible to fix the problems; we tax
lawyers pride ourselves on our ability to draft a rule for any situation.
The result, however, is not likely to be pretty. For example, the law
could provide that the payor may deduct alimony, that the owner of
125. This discussion accepts Professor Zelenak's view that Hoeper v. Tax Commission,
284 U.S. 206 (1931), is not likely to be continued authority that basing one spouse's tax
liability on factors related to the other is unconstitutional. See Zelenak, supra note 1, at
389-90. The assertion here is that it is inconsistent with the goals of individual filing.
126. See Christian, supra note 1, at 305-49 (decrying the fact that wives benefit less
than husbands from filing joint returns and the difficulty that wives face in obtaining a fair
share of the benefit).
127. In addition to the provisions in the recently enacted Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997
discussed above, see supra text accompanying notes 114-16, in that same Act, Congress
added phase-outs to the deduction for interest on education loans, see I.R.C. § 221(b)(2)
(West Supp. 1998), the Roth IRA, see id. § 408A(c)(3), and education IRAs, see id
§ 530(c)(1). The purpose of this discussion of phase-outs is not to defend these
congressional judgments, but rather to demonstrate that the personal income tax is
permeated with such rules, all of which present problems for the designer of an individual
return system.
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the property may deduct investment interest, that the child credit is
prorated, that the Lifetime Learning Credit is allocated to the spouse
being educated, and so on. Taxpayers currently face a mass of-to
them-arbitrary rules for determining what is deductible and to what
extent and what (if any) credit is allowed. Under individual filing,
married taxpayers would face a further set of arbitrary rules for
determining which spouse could deduct the item or claim the
credit. 128
2. Property
Assigning the income, deductions, and credits from the
ownership of property to the single returns of the spouses presents
problems. Professor Zelenak suggests two suitable ways of doing so:
(1) to follow ownership (his preference); or (2) to assign the income
to the higher-earning spouse.' 29 If taxability follows ownership of
property, the IRS will find itself entangled in the vagaries of state
law, particularly in the community property states, which differ
substantially among themselves in the way they treat property that
the spouses owned before marriage or receive by gift or inheritance
during marriage, and the income from these kinds of property.13
This will produce difficult administrative problems and differences in
taxation from state to state. There will be endless conflicts-of-law
problems about what kind of community property law should apply
to property. 31
It is suggested that husbands should be taxed on community
property in most states because of the presumptive control of the
property under state law.1 32 If that became the rule, community
property laws of each of the community property states would face
scrutiny from the IRS, and ultimately the courts, which would try to
determine whether the rights of the wife under state law are
sufficient to cause the income from the property to be taxed equally
to the spouses or whether all of the income should be taxed to the
128. This problem would not affect only itemizers because some of the deductionsfor example, for alimony and moving expenses-are allowable in computing adjusted
gross income, and all of the credits are available without regard to whether the taxpayer
itemizes.
129. See Zelenak, supranote 1, at 390-91.
130. See DE FuNIAK & VAUGHN, supra note 64, at 129-35, 301-04.
'131. It is true that state courts can and do unscramble these matters, but they need to
do so only in a small number of cases, usually when an issue arises from divorce or
inheritance. If the income tax were based on ownership, these issues would have to be
unscrambled in every case before the spouses could file their income tax returns.
132. See Davis, supra note 1, at 238-40.
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husband. Of course, the Supreme Court might refuse to do so,
3
having already considered the question during the 1920s and 1930s.
In Poe v. Seabom,134 the Supreme Court held that community
property laws would be given effect for federal income tax purposes
so that spouses in community property states could split their
incomes without regard to which spouse earned the income or owned
the property. 35 Many of the critical tax theorists dismiss Poe v.
Seabom as wrongly decided and an obstacle to the correct taxation of
married persons. 36 Congress should legislatively override it and
move on. This prescription illustrates well the air of unreality that
permeates much of this writing. Is it likely that Congress will abolish
the rule of Poe v. Seabom to the detriment of the voters of California
(who elect fifty-two representatives, approximately 12% of the
House of Representatives) and Texas (who elect another thirty,
approximately 7% of the House)? 13 7 Whatever one may think of Poe
v. Seaborn, it is a fact of life that should be accepted.
The representatives from the community property states will not
be persuaded by their constituents to vote to overrule Poe v. Seaborn
on the grounds advocated by the critical tax theorists: marriage
neutrality, elimination of the marriage penalty, and reducing the
disincentive for wives to work. If an individual filing system were
enacted, without Poe v. Seabom having been legislatively overruled,
then residents of community property states would have the best of
both worlds. Those concerned with marriage neutrality, the marriage
penalty, and reducing the wife's disincentives would file individual
returns. Those who now receive a marriage bonus would follow state
property law and report their shares of the community income,
thereby continuing to receive the benefits of income-splitting. In this
situation, there would be, as there was before 1948, an income tax
133. The issue of apportionment of tax between spouses in community property states
first came to the Supreme Court in United States v. Robbins, 269 U.S. 315 (1926), in which
the Court held that California taxpayers were not entitled to split their income because
the husband had too much control of the marital property. See id. at 327. After Poe v.
Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930), the California legislature amended its laws to vest control
of community property jointly in the spouses. This was held sufficient to allow incomesplitting. See United States v. Malcolm, 282 U.S. 792,794 (1930).
134. 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
135. See id. at 113.
136. See Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 104; Davis, supra note 1, at 238-39. But see
Gann, supra note 1, at 52-64 (analyzing the constitutionality of repealing Poe v. Seaborn
and some of the details of income attribution after its repeal).
137. See State Delegations, [105th Cong.] Cong. Index (CCH) 25,301, 25,301, 25,304
(Nov. 26, 1997) (listing 52 representatives to the House of Representatives from
California and 30 from Texas).
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advantage to residents of community property states, some of whom
would continue to enjoy marriage bonuses.
3. Head-of-Household Filing Status
Head-of-household filing status is now justified as a midpoint
between the single rate schedule and the joint return rate schedule
for those who are not married but are supporting children in the
home.'38 This is a widely used filing status; fifteen million taxpayers
utilized this rate schedule in 1995.139
It is difficult to find a rationale for the head-of-household rates
in an individual filing system. The premise of the head-of-household
rates is that single persons supporting dependent children need a tax
break delivered through the rate structure. In an individual filing
system, the premise underlying the rate structure would be that
everyone is single. If Congress wanted to provide single persons with
additional tax relief for the expenses of dependent children, it would
be more consistent with individual filing to provide an enhanced
dependents exemption for children or a larger child credit.
If head-of-household status remained in effect in an individual
filing system, many new questions would arise. If this status were
limited to unmarried persons, as it is at present, two problems would
exist: (1) the system would not be marriage-neutral; and (2)
unmarried persons supporting children would face a more favorable
rate structure than married persons supporting children, which is
hard to justify as social policy.l4 ° If head-of-household status were
made independent of marital status, then many married persons
would take advantage of it. Depending on the details of this status, in
some cases both spouses might be heads of households for income tax
purposes,' 4 ' with the result that many married couples would enjoy
more favorable rate tables than single people, which is the starting
point of this post-1969 cycle of the eternal battle over the taxation of
married persons.
4. Final Thoughts on Mandatory Individual Returns
None of this discussion is intended to show that it is impossible
138. See I.R.C. § 1(b) (West Supp. 1998); id. § 2(b).
139. See Daryl E. Cronk & Maureen Keenan, Individual Income Tax Returns: 1995,
Early Tax Estimates, IRS STAT. INCOME BULL., Fall 1996, at 8, 19 tbl.1 (showing 15
million of 109 million total returns filed as head of household).
140. This is, however, the effect of the earned income tax credit.
141. The Congressional Budget Office's study incorporates this assumption into its
"basic measure" of the marriage penalty. See CBO, supra note 57, at 29 box 6.
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to distribute the income and deductions of married couples in ways
that are administrable. 142 Rather, it is intended to show that it is not
easy to do so and that many very unsatisfactory compromises will be
required. I believe it shows that the resulting system would not be
any better overall than the system we have now; it would merely
disadvantage different groups who have at least as good a claim to
tax equity as those who are now disadvantaged.
V. MARRIAGE NEUTRALTY

The joint return (and associated anomalies in the standard
deduction) are only the most obvious ways in which the income tax
treats married people differently than otherwise identical people who
are not and never have been married. It is hard to tell whether the
critical tax theorists recommending marriage neutrality would favor
complete neutrality; their -recommendations are stated so generally
that there are no clues about implementing what they think is a
simple solution to a complex problem.'43 In the event some might
want complete marriage neutrality, this Section discusses some of the
many interesting problems that would arise if there were an attempt
to make the income tax truly marriage-neutral.
A. Attribution Rules
In some cases, the tax law attributes one spouse's activity or
ownership of property to the other. This may have the effect of
treating the spouses as alter egos; for example, in various corporate
transactions, the shares owned by the taxpayer's wife are treated as
owned by him,' 44 or the transaction may be disregarded as if the
taxpayer had engaged in it with himself. 45 Complete marriage
neutrality would require elimination of the attribution rules on the
grounds that all rules providing special treatment for persons who are
married should be eliminated. This would have consequences that
sometimes help and sometimes hurt taxpayers.
142. The United States successfully administered such a system from 1913 until 1948.
See id. app. A. That was, however, a time when most property was concentrated in
husbands' hands and when two-earner families were much less common. Most of the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development countries administer
individual return systems today as a result of a shift from joint to individual filing during
the 1970s. See id. To my knowledge, none of those countries has the problem of different
systems of property law existing in sub-national jurisdictions.
143. See MCCAFFERY, supra note 1, at 277-79; Moran & Whitford, supra note 1, at
800-01.
144. See I.R.C. § 318(a)(1)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1998).
145. See id. §267(a)(1).
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Elimination of the stock attribution rules would make it possible
for taxpayers to enjoy losses on transactions that do not change the
economic status of the married couple.146 Marriage neutrality would
eliminate attribution of stock between spouses under I.R.C. § 318,
opening up the possibilities of abuse, for example, redeeming the
wife's stock in a closely held corporation while the husband retained
a controlling block of stock. 4 7 Sections 267(a)(1) and 707(b) would
not apply to spouses, and therefore taxpayers would be allowed to
recognize losses on intra-family sales of property, for example, sales
from husband to wife, or from wife to a partnership controlled by
husband.
Elimination of stock attribution in § 544(a)(2) would allow
taxpayers to avoid classification as a personal holding company more
easily by spreading the stock among more shareholders while still
retaining the stock within the family."4 The same change would
make it easier for taxpayers to avoid having their family-owned
corporations classified as closely held C corporations subject to the
at-risk and passive activity loss rules. 49
The grantor trust rules treat a taxpayer who is the grantor of a
trust as the owner of the trust if the income of the trust can be
distributed to or accumulated for the benefit of the taxpayer or his
spouse. 5 ° A marriage-neutral system would take the spouse out of
this rule, so that a grantor could shift the income of the trust to his
spouse by allowing her the right to the income or corpus in her
discretion.'
This would allow taxpayers with property to achieve
much of the benefit of the joint return, but at the price of putting the
property under the spouse's power.
The foregoing examples have shown how the elimination of
attribution rules would help taxpayers. Other changes to make the
Code marriage-neutral would hurt taxpayers. An employee is
allowed to exclude from gross income a variety of fringe benefits,
including some benefits provided to the employee's spouse or
dependent children. 52
A marriage-neutral income tax would
eliminate this rule, which is based on a view of the married couple as
sharing. Section 117(d) allows the exclusion of certain tuition
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

This assumes a community of interest between the spouses.
See I.R.C. § 302(b)(2), (b)(3) (1994).
See I.R.C. § 542(a)(2) (West Supp. 1998).
See id §§ 465(a)(1)(B), 469(a)(2)(B).
See I.RC. § 677(a) (1994).
See id. § 678.
See I.R.C. § 132(h)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1998).
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waivers by educational institutions, including tuition waivers for
spouses and dependent children of employees.153 This rule too would
be eliminated in a marriage-neutral system, at least as it applies to
spouses.
Under the present rules, a taxpayer may take into account his
spouse's participation in an activity in determining "material
participation," which will avoid the application of the passive activity
loss rule. 5 4 A marriage-neutral system would eliminate this rule,
thereby making it harder for some taxpayers to avoid the passive
activity loss rules.
B.

Divorce
If marriage were truly tax-neutral, then divorce should also be
tax-neutral. 5 5 Thus, alimony would be nondeductible; a taxpayer
generally cannot deduct payments that are not for carrying on a trade
or business or paid or incurred in income-producing activities,'156 and
payments to an ex-spouse certainly do not fall under either of these
categories. The rationale that the alimony deduction represents a
continued sharing of the husband's income after the marriage ends 57
has no place in a marriage-neutral system. Under general tax
principles, alimony received would probably be includible,' but the
hardship entailed by taxation of alimony and the obvious absurdity
(to all but tax lawyers) of double-taxing these payments would surely
be solved legislatively.
Section 1041 provides that gain and loss are not recognized on
the transfer of property between spouses or incident to their
divorce. 159 In a marriage-neutral system, this rule would be
eliminated so that gain and loss would be recognized on transfers of
property between spouses just as between strangers. This would
resurrect the complex and unsatisfactory state of the law under Davis

153. See id § 117(d).
154. See id § 469(h)(5). This rule applies even if the spouse owns no interest in the
activity and even if the spouses do not file a joint return. See Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(f)(3)
(as amended in 1996).
155. Currently, alimony payments are deductible to the payor. See I.R.C. § 215
(1994).
156. See I.R.C. § 162 (West Supp. 1998); I.R.C. § 212 (1994).
157. See S. REP. No. 94-938, at 124-25 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3439,
3558-59 (stating that splitting of income should be achieved by deduction in arriving at
adjusted gross income).
158. See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426,431 (1955).
159. See I.R.C. § 1041 (West Supp. 1998).
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v. Commissioner,16° in which husbands in common-law states were
deemed to have reportable gains on the transfer of appreciated
property to their ex-wives.' 6'
C. Do We Have to Go So Far?
It is certainly possible to argue that the joint return rules create
an order of marital non-neutrality different than that created by the
rules described in this Section. Thus, the rules that can be
characterized generally as anti-abuse rules, for example, §267, might
be left in place while the joint return was eliminated. This would be
in keeping with the adoption of rules for implementing individual
returns that are themselves inconsistent with marriage neutralitysuch as either of Professor Zelenak's proposals (prorating itemized
deductions and credits or assigning them to the higher earner), which
will treat the spouses very differently than they would be treated in a
system that ignored their marital status.
One might distinguish the joint return, which affects the
taxpayer's liability by reason of being married to someone, from the
attribution rules, which affect the taxpayer's liability by reason of
being married to a particular someone. That distinction will not
stand up to analysis. On the joint return, marriage usually has an
effect on the taxpayer's liability, but that effect can be an increase or
a decrease, depending on the characteristics-in particular, the
income-of the spouse. It is hard to see how, for purposes of
determining tax liability, the characteristic of the spouse's income is
different from the characteristic of the spouse's ownership of shares
in a closely held corporation.
It might also be argued that the attribution rules are based on
classifications much broader than marriage, typically including at
least some ancestors and descendants in addition to spouses.162 This
is true, but if the question is whether marriage may affect a
taxpayer's liability, the fact that birth can also affect a taxpayer's tax
liability is irrelevant. A spouse contemplating marriage should take
into account the whole range of tax benefits and burdens arising from
the marriage, including the benefits and burdens of the attribution
rules as well as the benefits and burdens of the joint return.
160. 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
161. See icL at 70-71.
162. See I.R.C. § 318(a)(1) (West Supp. 1998) (attribution from parents, children, and
grandchildren); id. § 267(c)(4) (attribution from siblings, ancestors, and lineal
descendants); LR.C. § 544(a)(2) (1994) (attribution from siblings, ancestors, and lineal
descendants).
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If the decision were to require mandatory individual returns but
not pursue other marriage-neutral goals, thus leaving the attribution
and other rules discussed in the previous section in effect, § 1041
would present a quandary. The law before § 1041 was not
satisfactory; it was confusing, inconsistent, and a trap for the
unwary. 163 Repealing it, but leaving other rules in effect would
present an odd mixture of results: A loss on a transfer of depreciable
property from husband to wife would be disallowed (not marriageneutral),' but a gain would be reportable (marriage-neutral), 165 and
would be ordinary gain even if § 1245 or § 1250 recapture did not
apply (not marriage-neutral). 66
Section 1041 could be left in effect, but that would allow married
couples who own property to achieve a quasi-joint return by selfhelp: The husband could transfer to his wife the property he wanted
to sell, thereby shifting the gain to her return and achieving some of
the advantages of the joint return. Section 1041 could be narrowed to
apply only to divorcing spouses, which would solve the Davis
problem without permitting the wholesale shuffling of the spouses'
property for tax purposes.
VI. CONCLUSION

The main point to be made in conclusion is that there is no
conclusion to these topics. Virtually every argument made can be
countered by another argument proceeding from different premises
or even from the same premises. One person's marriage penalty is
another's proper sharing of the tax burden. Wonderful-sounding
solutions, for example, mandatory individual filing to eliminate the
marriage penalty, turn out to be full of complexity and present their
163. The problem in Davis arose from the fact that recently divorced husbands did not
perceive a gain when they transferred property to their ex-wives. Accordingly, they
usually did not report the gain. The wife, however, would usually use a fair market value
at date of transfer basis for the property when she sold it. The Treasury thus lost the
revenue that should have been reported on the appreciation of the property in the
husband's hands. See H.R. REP. No. 98-432, at 1491-92 (1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 697,1134-36.
There was also a problem of geographic non-uniformity. In the community property
states, spouses were allowed to split the community property asset by asset, for example,
the husband would take the business, and the wife would take the home, without
triggering gain. In a common-law state, this transaction would trigger gain to the husband
with respect to his interest in the home and to the wife with respect to her interest in the

business.
164. See I.R.C. § 267(a)(2) (West Supp. 1998).
165. See id. § 1001.
166. See id. § 1239.
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own dilemmas.
My own conclusion, not widely shared in Washington or among
academic writers, is that the existing system is not all bad. Rather, it
is a quite defensible balancing of the various goals of the income tax.
If changes must be made, however, let me propose a simple solution
to address the problems: a flat-rate income tax. Modify the existing
income tax to impose a flat rate (including no special rate for capital
gains). 167 A rate of about 20% would suffice for the flat tax proposed
here.'6
In the system described, there would be minimal marriage
penalties and bonuses and no income tax disincentives for wives to
become second earners. 69 There would be less reason for employers
to shift their compensation packages for highly compensated
individuals toward tax-favored fringe benefits and deferred
compensation arrangements, a change that would equalize the
treatment of white men with that of blacks and women. Well-to-do
taxpayers would have less incentive to avoid the high rates by
engaging in property transactions that are not available to the poor,
for example, gifts to low-bracket children.
This is a specific proposal for changes that would solve many of
the problems about which the critical tax authors complain. Unlike
many of their proposals, which are so lacking in detail that they can
hardly be analyzed, all the details are in place. Unlike proposals to
base tax rates on the taxpayer's sex, there is nothing obviously wrong
with this proposal.
Unfortunately, I doubt that many of the writers would regard the
167. The proposal would not change the tax base; it would accept the existing
definitions of gross income and deductions and allow the current hodgepodge of credits.
The proposed tax is not akin to the so-called flat taxes proposed in Congress, which
have very large standard deductions and personal exemptions and are thus graduated,
with 0% on the first $XX and some flat rate-17% is most widely promoted-above that.
These proposals tax mainly wage income and disallow most or all the itemized
deductions. See, e.g., Freedom and Fairness Restoration Act of 1995, H.R. 2060, 104th
Cong. (1995) (flat tax based on Hall-Rabushka model); USA Tax Act of 1995, S. 722,
104th Cong. (1995) (USA Tax, allowing deduction for savings and some existing
deductions).
168. In 1994, individual taxpayers reported about $2.6 trillion of taxable income, that
is, income after deductions and personal exemptions, and paid about $530 billion in
personal income taxes. See Selected Historical and Other Data, IRS STAT. INCOME
BULL., Summer 1997, at 133, 134-36 tbl.1. A more refined estimate of the necessary rate
would take into account the recent changes in personal credits.
169. These results follow because all the couple's combined income would continue to
be taxed at the same flat rate rather than pushing some of their combined income into
higher brackets. There might be other disincentives, for example, employment taxes, but,
as stated above, that is a different topic. See supra text accompanying note 56.
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above proposal as an improvement over current law. They would be
unwilling to give up the redistribution achieved by the progressive
rates even though the progressive rates are the primary cause of the
problems about which they complain. In other words, they would
tinker with the system to solve little problems, with the inevitable
consequence of creating other problems-some foreseeable, some
not.
Even Professor Zelenak, who admits sympathy with the goals of
these writers, finds most of the proposals seriously and obviously
flawed. 70 Starting with little sympathy for these goals, I find little to
recommend in any of this writing. It is unfortunate that some
intelligent people have spent a lot of time writing and theorizing
about problems that are insolvable when there are serious topics in
the tax law that could profit from legal analysis.

170. See Lawrence Zelenak, Taking Critical Tax Theory Seriously, 76 N.C. L. REv.
1521 (1998).

